by Garfield Scott
The 2008 Olympics as a Soft Power Strategy by China
China has engaged in soft power strategies throughout the world since reforming its economics from socialism to capitalism. These strategies have occurred mostly in the form of economic policies, such as helping countries develop their infrastructure, entering trade agreements, corporate investment in economic development, and Chinese government aid to foreign governments for economic development (Morante & Wu 2023; Nantalyua 2018; Repnikova 2022). Yet Joseph Nye’s theory of soft power also includes promotion of culture and values (Nye 2016). A review of the literature shows the culture and values elements to be a relatively overlooked use of soft power. Most of the literature focuses on the economic elements of China’s soft power strategy, which makes sense because those elements also carry China’s primary goal: economic growth. This analysis shows how China used the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing as a soft power strategy focused on culture and values. First, the analysis begins with background on soft power theory as developed by Nye and a discussion of China’s economic soft power strategies around the world. Then, the analysis focuses on how China used the 2008 Olympics to promote its culture and values to the world. The analysis shows that China used this type of soft power strategy to legitimize itself as a global powerhouse, which inevitably supports its primary goal of economic growth to serve the interests of its citizens in quality-of-life gains from capitalist reforms. The Olympics soft power strategy focused on three messages: Presenting China as a Peaceful Global Leader; Diminishing China’s Reputation for Human Rights Violations; and, Presenting China as a Culture and Nation Worthy of Respect. The final section discusses the implications of these findings by integrating them with the literature on China’s soft power. While these messages might reflect cultural and values aspects of soft power, they are ultimately intended to deliver economic benefits.
Soft Power Theory
Joseph Nye developed his soft power theory to explain how states use non-military forms of power to gain influence. In the 2016 edition of his book, Bound to Lead, first published in 1990, Nye claims that “soft sources of power are becoming more important in world politics today” (Nye 2016, 33). Most states do not seek military power to gain influence because the costs are too great, Nye said. Military aggression creates economic costs because most states are interconnected as part of the global economy, and states will be excluded from the global economy if they use hard power (Nye 2016).
Soft power can include range from economic assistance to other countries to the promotion of culture and values. Daniele Carminati, in her essay, “The State of China’s Soft Power in 2020,” identifies cultural exports as a form of soft power (Carminati 2020). Cultural exports, such as music, film, and television shows, forge a bond between peoples of different countries as they realize that they have more similarities than differences. For example, South Korea and Japan are historical rivals that have both used soft power strategies of cultural exports to each other, resulting in warmer relations between the states (Carminati 2020). However, most of the literature documents soft power strategies of major states such as the United States and China to fall in the economic category (Cho et al. 2008; Hassig 2012; Herr 2019; Li 2011). These policies include:
- Investment in economic development by companies headquartered in the state using soft power (known as foreign direct investment)
- Investment in economic development through government aid (this often occurs in tandem with foreign direct investment by companies)
- Free trade agreements
- Economic assistance during crises
This emphasis on economic elements of soft power make sense given that the goal of soft power in the world today is economic rather than military. Nye describes this reality of the world today as the result of several factors (Nye 2016):
- The end of the Cold War meant that military alliances were no longer as important as economic alliances
- Globalization has created an interconnected global economy where countries compete economically to improve or maintain the quality of life for their citizens
- Military aggression in this climate of economic interconnectedness makes hard power too costly
- International institutions, such as the United Nations, more effectively uphold state sovereignty and penalize violators of other state’s sovereignty
Foreign Investment, Trade, & Manufacturing
President Hu Jintao formally stated China’s commitment to soft power at the 17th Communist Party of China Congress in 2007 (Herr 2019). These statements also include President Jintao’s assertion that China would pursue “a peaceful rise” to global power through economic growth, economic alliances, and cultural soft power strategies (Herr 2019). Much of the rhetoric from China’s leadership since 2007 has referred to soft power with cultural and values references, but most of the scholarship focuses on economic aspects of soft power by China in this century.
Many of China’s soft power strategies have focused on foreign direct investment and government economic assistance. By the end of the first decade of the 21st Century, China invested $26 billion economic development in Africa, and trade between China and Africa increased from $12 million in 1950 to $114 billion in 2010 (Hassig 2012). These efforts continued into the second decade of this century with further investments in economic development, increased investment by Chinese enterprises, and formalization of free trade agreements with the African Union (Nantulya, 2018). President Xi Jinping, at the 19th Communist Party of China Congress, declared these efforts in Africa to constitute “soft power with Chinese characteristics” (Nantulya 2018, 2). This use of soft power in Africa is attributed to the warm diplomatic relations between China and most states of the African Union (Hassig 2012; Nantulya 2018).
China’s Belt-and-Road Initiative is certainly the soft power strategy that gains the most attention in the literature and media. China has entered partnerships with foreign states from Latin America to Central Asia to Africa to build infrastructure necessary for trade (Repnikova 2022; Morante & Wu 2023). The initiative provides government and foreign direct investment to countries for roads, railways, ports, communications infrastructure and other development projects necessary economic modernization; initially, the initiative was intended for China to gain access to those markets for their exports (Morante & Wu 2023). More recently, scholars have documented China’s use of the Initiative for economic growth through foreign direct investment, particularly as the prices of its goods rise compared to cheaper exporters (Repnikova 2022; Morante & Wu 2023).
Aid and Assistance
China also uses soft power in the form of aid and assistance to countries. This soft power approach does not have a direct economic objective in mind like the Belt-and-Road Initiative (Herr 2019; Li 2011). Rather, this form of soft power attempts to improve relations with countries by strengthening diplomatic relations. Aid and assistance from China provide the recipient countries with an incentive to ally with China and support its growing prominence in the world and in their countries (Cho 2008; Repnikova 2022). Economic aid can be delivered as a long-term relationship between China and the recipient country, while assistance can be delivered for immediate needs, such as economic crises or natural disasters (Li 2011; Repnikova 2022).
While the primary objective of these forms of soft power are diplomatic, not economic, scholars assert an ultimate economic objective. For example, China’s alliances with some countries in Africa are believed to reflect its interest in rare minerals and other natural resources necessary for its economic development (Nantulya 2018). China’s alliances with Asian countries are believed to reflect China’s interest in maintaining trade routes and fossil fuel energy supplies (Li 2011; Repnikova 2022).
Culture and Values: Alliances in Politics and Education
China’s soft power strategies also emphasize culture and values. In Africa, for example, China has emphasized the shared anticolonial values it shares with states that were formed when they liberated from European rule (Hassig 2012). China compares its socialist and revolutionary history to these African histories. Scholars have observed that these comparisons of shared values and history between China and African states can position them against Western influences, which are associated with colonialism (Li 2011; Nantulya, 2018; Repnikova 2022). China uses a similar strategy in Latin America, emphasizing those states’ experience with both European colonialism and American neocolonialism in the region (Morante & Wu 2023). Alliance with China, China argues to these states, can maintain national economic and political power against America (Morante & Wu 2023).
Similar to the analysis of non-economic soft power strategies, these cultural and values soft power strategies might not have a direct economic objective. However, scholars believe that the ultimate objective of cultural and values soft power strategies by China is to build alliances that benefit China’s economic interests (Hassig 2012; Li 2011; Morante & Wu 2023; Repnikova 2022). China’s interests in Latin America, for example, include trade and foreign direct investment (Morante & Wu 2023).
Soft Power and the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing
This section analyses China’s use of soft power in the 2008 Olympics. Specific activities and messaging by China before, during, and after the Olympics are subjected to content analysis. The analysis focuses on how China’s use of the Olympics represented a culture and values form of soft power. The data comes from anecdotes, statements, and observations in the scholarly literature, while some data also came from videos of the opening and closing ceremonies, which included commentary by foreign broadcasters. The analysis reveals three motivations for China in soft power strategies for the Olympics: Presenting China as a Peaceful Global Leader; Diminishing China’s Reputation for Human Rights Violations; and, Presenting China as a Culture and Nation Worthy of Respect. These motivations can be considered interconnected in any single message or activity.
Soft Power Gains in the Bidding and Awarding Process
Winning a bid to be an Olympic host explicitly legitimizes a state’s claim to be respected and valued on the world stage. China’s intent in winning the bid for the 2008 Olympics was to legitimize its position in the world after the capitalist reforms transformed China into one of the great economic powers. When China won the bid in 2001 from the International Olympic Committee, Vice Premier Li Lanqing stated:
This shows that the international community has acknowledged the fact that China is marked by social stability and progress, its economy is prospering and its people living a peaceful and comfortable life (Jarvie et al. 2008, 129).
This statement also included references to defeating the religious cult Falun Gong. Scholars have suggested that China used this statement to defend against critics of its human rights policies (Jarvie et al. 2008). If the International Olympic Committee recognized China as a legitimate state to host the 2008 games, the vice premier argued, China’s human rights violations must not be significant enough to warrant concern from the international community (Jarvie et al. 2008). China not only legitimized itself as a peaceful nation to be respected, winning the Olympics also discredited the claims of its critics.
Indeed, Beijing failed in its earlier bids for the Olympics, including the 2000 games (Price & Dayan, 2009). These rejections by the IOC were attributed to Western criticism of China’s human rights record (Jarvie et al. 2008). For example, the United States Congress officially protested China’s bid for the 2000 games, citing the human rights violations against ethnic minorities and religious minorities (Jarvie et al. 2008).
Winning the bid to host the games also legitimizes the operational credibility of the host government, including local authorities. Price and Dayan (2009) document the arguments made by China and Beijing authorities to secure the winning 2008 bid. These arguments emphasized Beijing’s recent economic growth, which was the result of national and regional government policies and actions. Beijing’s rise to a great city of the world illustrated China’s rise to a great state of the world. Economic growth was associated with governmental competence, which must be demonstrated to the IOC by host applicants who will be responsible for major operational challenges (Price & Dayan 2009).
China’s bid materials also emphasized China’s credibility as a peaceful world power. One statement from the bid materials presented to the IOC stated:
A chance for Beijing to host the Games would provide a closer link between the Eastern and Western worlds, bring fresh blood to the Olympics movement and a true meaning of universality (Price & Dayan, 2009, 156).
The statement’s reference to the West implies that the Olympic hosts have been dominated by Western cities/countries. The reference to a link between East and West implicitly references the traditional conflict between East and West, which can be moderated by awarding the bid to China. The bid materials also emphasized that the torch would travel along the Silk Road, which of course is the ancient road used by Westerners to access the riches of China (Price & Dayan, 2009). This cultural reference established China as a great cultural and economic power that is perhaps more desirous to the West than the West is to China but in any case is willing to live in harmony with the West.
Yet the statement also includes the concept that awarding the bid to China will bring “fresh blood to the Olympics movement” (Price & Dayan 2009). This phrase in the statement might have been intended to imply that the Western-dominated history of hosts deserves to be moderated by awarding the bid to China. China is the fresh blood that the Western-dominated Olympics must recognize because China has risen to power due to its economic reforms, which demands respect.
References to Beijing as a rising great city of the world was also included in the bid process. The motto of the bid slogan was “New Beijing, Great Olympics” (Price & Dayan 2009, 156). The reference to a new Beijing implies that the old Beijing was unprepared to host an Olympics. Ironically, China’s language choice in the motto might have acknowledged this fact of underdevelopment in the past. However, the reference to a new Beijing implies that the city was fully modernized and capable of delivering all of the resources and services of the Olympics, including venues, transportation, and hospitality.
Winning the bid for 2008 must be placed into historical context to affirm its importance as a soft power victory for China. The winning bid for 2008 followed decades of China’s failures to secure the Olympics. The earliest controversy involved whether Taiwan could participate in the Games following the 1949 revolution establishing the People’s Republic (Price & Dayan 2009). The Western-dominated IOC recognized Taiwan rather than the PRC as China’s representative in 1949, which was an obvious rejection based on ideological grounds (anti-Communist). When the PRC was recognized as the Chinese representative in the United Nations, the IOC recognized the PRC as the official representative and withdrew recognition of Taiwan. Thus, the awarding of the bid to Beijing can be considered part of an evolution of credibility for China on the world stage.
Winning the bid to host the games immediately legitimizes the city and nation because the award comes from the IOC, which is dominated by members from other countries. An analysis by Price and Dayan (2009) of official rhetoric by countries that win the bid shows that the host can use the award itself as propaganda delivered to domestic and international audiences. Following in that tradition, China framed the bid as international recognition of China’s legitimacy at multiple levels: competency, economic greatness, and legitimacy in its domestic governance.
Soft Power Messaging in Opening and Closing Ceremonies
The Opening and Closing Ceremonies of the 2008 Olympics provided China with an opportunity to highlight its cultural credibility. The official titles of the ceremonies referenced the cultural heritage of China (“Brilliant Civilization” and “Glorious Era”). The ceremonies featured ancient and contemporary aspects of its culture and also referenced the founding of the People’s Republic.
Perhaps the most dramatic event, and the one that received much commentary from foreign observers, was the drum performance in the opening ceremonies. The drum event featured 2,008 drummers playing simultaneously (Cabula & Pochettino 2023). This event sent a message to the international audience that China had a rich heritage that could be managed with extraordinary logistical sophistication. Other events during the ceremonies featured 2,008 performers, such as the tai chi performance. These examples of artistry and logistics showed that China deserved to be appreciated for its rich culture, and China deserved to be respected for its competency.
Some foreigners reacted negatively to the drum performance and others that involved large numbers of performers operating in tandem with each other, yet even these negative reactions might indicate an effective outcome in China’s messaging. Some foreign critics claimed the drum performance affirmed Chinese culture’s lack of individualism and collective power, which could be a threat to China’s rivals (Cabula & Pochettino 2023). Yet even these foreign critics (who might also have revealed their bigotry by suggesting that the drummers were mindless robots) had to acknowledge that the event affirmed China’s competency.
China used the ceremonies to affirm its credibility as a modern state. Videos of the opening and closing ceremonies reveal a high level of technical sophistication, including use of lighting, special effects, audio, architecture, and design. The main venue, known as the bird’s nest, was an extraordinary structure of aesthetics and engineering and served as the stage for the ceremonies. Commentary of the foreign broadcasters for the ceremonies included repeated positive references to both China’s culture and to the operational competency of those responsible for developing and managing the performances.
China used the symbols during the ceremonies to challenge Western criticism of its rise as a threat. Much of the messaging of the ceremonies emphasized peace and humanitarianism, such as little girl flying a kite and a performance that brought the performers into the form of a dove, which is a symbol of peace. The parade of athletes during the ceremonies emphasized the universality of competition, which is an interesting aspect of the Olympics. Athletic competition places countries into a literal contest with each other, and fans of each nation cheer for their athletes and root against foreign athletes. Yet both sides agree to the fairness of competition, and they agree to the outcomes even if they lose. If athletes can demonstrate these traits in international competition, nations should be able to compete with each other on the world stage, whether economically or for prestige, without resorting to physical conflict. The parade of athletes combined nationalistic pride with this concept of international cooperation. As the venue for this display, China could send a message to the world that it held these values of universal fair play on the world stage.
Hosting Responsibilities and Soft Power Gains for China
China displayed its credibility as an advanced state by effectively managing its hosting responsibilities. One of the key issues before the 2008 Olympics involved Beijing’s problem of high levels of air pollution (Jarvie et al. 2008). Indeed, one of the reasons Beijing lost the 2000 games, in addition to human rights criticism, was the air pollution levels (Jarvie et al. 2008). Members of the IOC did not believe that athletes could compete with such high pollutant levels. In its bid materials, Beijing provided documentation of how it would address the pollution problem in Beijing (Jarvie et al. 2008). Most importantly, Beijing succeeded in cleaning its airborne pollutants, and media noted the competency of city officials toward this effort, which required shutting down automobile traffic and restricting other sources of pollutants before and during the games (Cabula & Pochettino 2023). The irony of this situation is that Beijing showed less interest in clearing air pollution for its own citizens, yet it did show the ability to clear the air for the Olympic guests and athletes.
Hosting responsibilities also include building venues, providing transportation for guests, and providing accommodations for guests. China established its credibility as a high-functioning state in meeting these responsibilities. Foreign media generally praised China for hosting the games with logistical precision (Cabula & Pochettino 2023). This praise recognized the competency of China not just in meeting demand for these services but also by providing exceptionally high-quality services (Cabula & Pochettino 2023). This messaging was quite effective as a soft power gain for China because it was made by foreign observers and thus had more credibility to foreign audiences.
Displays of Athleticism
China committed enormous resources not just to operational aspects of hosting the Olympics but also to athletic competition. The commitment to athletic competition was intended to display to the world China’s credibility as a nation that could recruit and train the greatest athletes in the world. Jarvie et al. (2008) documented the financial investments in training children for future Olympic competition beginning in the 1990s but increasing substantially after the awarding of the 2008 games in 2001. Many of the competitions include young athletes, such as gymnastics, and once the 2008 games were awarded China significantly increased its national gymnastics program and investments in other Olympics sports where China could be competitive (Jarvie et al. 2008).
This investment paid off greatly for China as it won 100 medals, including 48 golds (International Olympic Committee 2024). The United States of America, predictably, won the most medals, including 112 overall, but this included 36 gold medals (International Olympic Committee 2024). Thus, China’s investment in athletic development meant that it was the gold medal winner of the 2008 games.
China’s athletic achievements were mentioned throughout the international commentary of the 2008 games (Cabula & Pochettino 2023; Price & Dayan 2009). China and its individual athletes were praised for their exceptional skills, which could only be possible due to an advanced national athletic program. The athletic achievements legitimized China as an exceptional modern-nation state with the wealth and expertise to develop international athletes that could beat the best in the world, notably American athletes.
Scholars have noted the irony of China’s success in games that were mostly developed in the West, and China might have achieved a message beyond the obvious one. Jarvie et al. (2008) document a history of China’s interest in international athletic competition predating the People’s Republic. The Republic of China in the early 20th Century welcomed foreign trainers to develop a youth athletic program in sports that were unknown to most Chinese (Jarvie et al. 2008). By competing successfully in international sports developed mostly in the West, China might have succeeded in sending the implicit message that it could compete and even win on terms established by the West.
This message, though arguable, might be extended to an overall soft power messaging strategy from the 2008 Olympics. China’s ability to host the Beijing games could arguably be attributed to capitalist reforms tempered and guided by the Communist Party. China’s rise to economic greatness thus included a Chinese modification of capitalism. China competes on the world economic stage by adapting Western capitalism with socialist-Chinese features. Likewise, China competes on the Olympics stage in events mostly created by the West with Chinese training and athletes. This is a somewhat paradoxical yet compelling message of soft power for China given its status in the world today. On the one hand, China had to catch up to the West economically by adopting capitalism, but China used its own cultural features to promote capitalist growth on its own terms.
China’s Ultimate Soft Power Objective
The analysis of soft power messaging of the 2008 games affirms three themes: China as a Peaceful Global Leader; Diminishing China’s Reputation for Human Rights Violations; and, Presenting China as a Culture and Nation Worthy of Respect. Beijing was awarded not just the 2008 games but also the 2022 winter games, which suggests that the soft power messages of the 2008 games succeeded at validating China on these three measures on the world stage. Each of these elements relates to a fundamental economic interest for China validated by the scholarship on China’s soft power strategy. Even though the Olympics might relate to culture and values, soft power in the Olympics must be considered as part of an overall strategy of soft power for economic gains.
In fact, China’s interest in presenting itself as a culture and nation worthy of respect did not begin with the 2008 games. Scholars have referred to China’s soft power messages using “public diplomacy spectacles” that date from the late 20th Century (Repnikova 2022, 40). These spectacles emphasize China’s literal size and power. The goal is to send the message that China’s economy is large and powerful enough to build venues, host international organizations, and manage its economy. Repnikova (2022) documents dozens of economic events that include the soft power message of public diplomacy spectacles dating back to the 1990s. These exist at the national and regional levels depending on what economic activity China wants to promote.
In addition to sending a soft power message in how the events are managed, these events also provide an opportunity for Chinese diplomats, officials, and business persons to form relationships with foreign economic players (Repnikova 2022). These events organize large numbers of people in positions of public and private power from throughout the world, including the United States, the European Union, Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Repnikova (2022) frames the spectacular cultural performances of the 2008 games as part of an overall soft power economic message emphasizing respect for China’s economic strength, which should encourage foreigners to enter partnerships with the government or Chinese companies. Similar spectacles occur in economic events, both in how they are organized and in their specific cultural demonstrations.
Scholars documented China’s successful use of cultural soft power in the 1990s to achieve economic gains with its Asian neighbors. Cho and Jeong (2008) documented China’s establishment of regional television and radio broadcasts, increased economic aid, and promotion of itself as a destination for international students in higher education. These efforts occurred within the processes of regional organizations devoted to economic agreements, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Cho & Jeong 2008). China promotes Confucian ideals through educational alliances with other nations and promotes the Beijing Language and Culture University as a destination for foreign students (Repnikova 2022). Are these cultural or economic in their ultimate goal?
One could argue that cultural emphases are made in support of economic gains, notably the training of professionals to deliver economic development gains. The promotion of Confucian ideals and Mandarin might be a cultural form of soft power, but it occurs in an educational setting that is oriented toward economic development. Likewise, the promotion of cultural values in the 2008 Olympics can be argued to have this overall economic goal of presenting China as a desirable trading partner, place to do business, and source of foreign direct investment. Deflecting criticism of human rights is essential for China to maintain trade relations and avoid economic/political isolation. Indeed, many critics of China’s human rights violations have cited those to discourage countries from entering free-trade agreements, engaging in foreign direct investment, and engaging in other economic arrangements (Herr 2019; Li 2011). These efforts have mostly failed, and China’s economic influence has only grown globally and in key markets since 2008.
The fact that China succeeded in winning the 2022 games indicates successful mitigation of foreign criticism of its human rights record. In fact, international media criticism of human rights violations in China have increased since the 2008 games, particularly the treatment of Uyghur minorities (Li 2011; Herr 2019). Nevertheless, this criticism appears to lack enough urgency to influence policies toward China, including efforts by human rights organizations to deny the bid for the 2022 games (Cabula & Pochettino 2023). Human rights concerns about China have diminished considerably in the United States political leadership since the 1990s, which indicates less influence of human rights organizations and greater influence by China to frame the debate (Repnikova 2022).
The Beijing Olympics also sought to portray China as a peaceful giant on the world stage. The symbolic messaging was no different than that of other countries that emphasize international cooperation and humanitarian values universal to all peoples. This is the message of the Olympics itself. However, the soft power message from Beijing contrasts strongly with the events surrounding China’s hard power activities, particularly the policies in the South China Sea and with Taiwan. Herr (2019) uses the symbol of yin and yang to illustrate China’s use of hard and soft power to pursue military and economic outcomes, yet the analysis also reveals the ultimate objective of economic gain.
This image of a peaceful global player might be undermined by hard power tactics and other tactics associated with an expansion of sovereignty. China’s aggressive military actions in the South China Sea are believed to originate in China’s interest in protecting trade routes and natural resources in the region. These hard power actions and aggressive diplomatic efforts include fortifying military installations in the South China Sea, conducting military exercises, asserting territorial rights in disputed waters, and ignoring international legal findings (Herr 2019; Repnikova 2022). Yet whether one believes that China is an aggressive or peaceful player with its Southeast neighbors, the fact is that all of its tactics can be explained by an ultimate goal of economic gains.
Implications for Soft Power Theory and China
These findings of the 2008 Olympics and other instances of China’s soft power support an overall intent toward economic gains. Soft power theory might need to be revised, at least for China. Nye described different types of soft power, notably those that are economic and those that are cultural. This framing of soft power implies that they might have different goals. Economic soft power might be intended to achieve economic gains, and cultural soft power might be intended to achieve diplomatic gains. The 2008 Olympics delivered soft power messages about China as a peaceful global player, a nation worth of respect, and an unfair object of human rights criticism. Based on China’s soft and hard power activities in other settings, an economic rationale can be considered the ultimate objective. Even cultural soft power for China has an economic objective.
Conclusion
This analysis revealed how China used the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing as a soft power strategy focused on culture and values. The Olympics soft power strategy delivered three messages to the world: China Is a Peaceful Global Leader; China Is Undeserving of Human Rights Criticisms; and, China Is a Culture and Nation Worthy of Respect. China has engaged in soft power strategies throughout the world since reforming its economics from socialism to capitalism. These strategies have occurred mostly in the form of economic policies, such as helping countries develop their infrastructure, entering trade agreements, corporate investment in economic development, and Chinese government aid to foreign governments for economic development. While this analysis showed that China used the Beijing Olympics for cultural soft power messaging, the broader analysis of China’s soft power strategy suggests a primary goal of economic gains.
The Beijing soft power strategy was part of this broader economic strategy to maintain positive economic relations with other countries and legitimize its control of economic resources. China wants to maintain good terms of free-trade agreements, encourage foreign direct investment in China, encourage other countries to allow Chinese foreign direct investment, and legitimize its territorial claims. China pursues these goals through cultural soft power strategies, but these cannot be considered as ends unto themselves. Instead, they might be reframed as soft power tactics that are oriented toward the ultimate goal of soft power itself, which is economic gain.
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